On the analytical and normative dimensions of conviviality and cosmopolitanism

This text is a slightly modified version of the lecture by Magdalena Nowicka (Humboldt University Berlin) and Tilmann Heil (University Konstanz) held on June 25th, 2015 at the Eberhard Karls University Tubingen, Germany

Introduction

Based on the Latin roots for ‘with’ and ‘living’, the term ‘conviviality’ has long been associated with sociable, friendly and festive traits. Yet, from cultural studies and philosophy to urban geography, sociology and anthropology, its current usages convey a deeper concern with the human condition and how we think about human modes of togetherness. Current academic usages of the notion of ‘conviviality’ often carry a normative connotation. We propose to use conviviality as an analytical term; as such, it directs our focus on the everyday processes of how people live together in mundane encounters, of how they (re)translate between their sustained differences and how they (re)negotiate minimal consensuses. Conviviality has a conceptual family resemblance to several other notions currently in public and academic circulation, including cosmopolitanism, civility, trust, multiculture and multiculturalism, diversity, integration, cohesion and social capital, whereby conviviality appears as an alternative to cosmopolitanism (Gilroy 2004). As a strategy for this lecture, we have decided to juxtapose conviviality and cosmopolitanism; the latter is well established in the literature and we believe that by comparing the two terms we can better demonstrate the analytical advantages of conviviality over cosmopolitanism. We first scrutinize the normative dimension of cosmopolitanism, providing a very brief historical overview of understandings of cosmopolitanism; we then turn to discuss normative visions comprised by conviviality. We then discuss the shift from normative to analytical cosmopolitanism, and the analytical limitations of this term to afterwards return to conviviality in order to show its analytical merits. We support our argument with examples from our research.
Throughout the lecture we operate with a triad of the normative, the empirical and the analytical. We argue that historically and geographically specific empirical conditions shape particular understandings of cosmopolitanism and conviviality which respond to these empirical challenges. Contemporary cosmopolitanism and conviviality point to the same kind of empirical necessities for action. Yet normative cosmopolitanism and normative conviviality encompass a number of different proposals of how to deal with the empirical challenges. We engage in details with these differences. We then discuss the birth of the analytical cosmopolitanism which we perceive as related to the social scientific pre-occupation with the empirical crises. Analytical cosmopolitanism emerges out of the claim of the lack of adequate analytical instruments to analyze a crisis; such instruments are a condition for successfully coping with the crisis. Analytical conviviality, we will argue, needs to go beyond analytical cosmopolitanism in how it understands the empirical condition of the human, and in particular in how it understands the individual.

**Cosmopolitanism – normative vision**

The slippery and evanescent meanings of cosmopolitanism are widely discussed and criticized in the current scholarly debate, while the manifold applications of the term certify the deeper significance of the concept. It is impossible to give a detailed account of the full variety of perspectives on cosmopolitanism that has already emerged within multiple disciplines since the 1990s alone. In coming to terms with the concept though, it is useful to distinguish the sources and perspectives that have shaped the scholarly understandings. In the following we discuss two theses: first, we want to show that cosmopolitanism is constructed around the antinomy between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, between vision and practice, between the normative and the empirical. Second, we show that cosmopolitanism is concerned with HOW to empirically realize the normative ideal. This HOW is related to the rights and obligation of an individual towards a community; the notion of community, we will show, is subject to different projections grounded in the imaginaries of social life that are typical for specific times and spaces.

The most prominent interventions in contemporary political philosophy and social sciences depart from ancient—Cynic and Stoic—(e.g., Nussbaum 1996)—or Kantian (e.g., Hannerz 1990; Held 1995; Benhabib 2006; Fine 2007)—assumptions. Ancient cosmopolitanism was fundamentally a moral commitment to helping humans, or at least to respecting and promoting basic human rights and justice irrespective of people’s
belonging to the polis. Aristotle considered the polis to be a collective of citizens who were distinguished from other inhabitants, such as resident aliens, slaves, ordinary workers, and even children and seniors (Miller 2012). The political culture of the polis, the city-state could thus hardly be called cosmopolitan as it actively excluded many people from any ethical consideration of the community.

Not only resident aliens constituted a challenge to the logic of the political community of the polis; its conventional political ties were also questioned by the traveling intellectuals whose experiences were fruitful grounds for cosmopolitan ideals. These were reflected, for example, in Plato’s writings *Protagoras* and the *Dialogues*, which include the cosmopolitan idea that the polis must reflect the order of the cosmos so as to provide happiness for its citizens (Betti 2010). Socrates—at least as Plato characterized him—was a citizen of the world who recognized only limited obligations to Athens and the Athenians (Brown 2000). Socrates’s cosmopolitan stance inspired the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope, who, when asked where he came from, allegedly replied, “I am a citizen of the world (Kleingeld, Brown 2014). The Cynic-inspired Stoics combined the idea of belonging to the conventional polis with citizenship of the cosmos. Stoic cosmopolitanism relied on the ideal that living as a citizen of the cosmos means being in agreement with the right reasons that pervade nature, but also to engage in ordinary politics (Brown 2006). Ancient cosmopolitanism, therefore, sets out a clear social order: one is a citizen of the world before being a citizen of a state. From the start, a juridical and political order of the world is on a planetary scale, and not extrapolated from the city-state.

The Macedonian era brought about a new empirical situation and a change in how cosmopolitanism was defined. Alexander the Great’s conquests and the subsequent division of his empire fostered increased contact among cities (Kleingeld, Brown 2014). The historians of the time, most notably Polybius and Plutarch added to the Stoic vision of cosmopolitanism the historical and empirical examination of how the (Greek-Roman) world came to be “one place” (Inglis, Robertson 2004). Henceforth, one needed to unite the cities into one community. Human community was thus extrapolated from the union of cities.

Medieval cosmopolitanism, linked to the travelers’ and traders’ experiences as a form of living (Edwards 2013, p. 164), represented yet another situation: it presupposed an attachment to a common set of beliefs, a unified Christian community. The empirical medieval cosmopolis is therefore a community of those who love God, while politics is
severed from the tasks of building good human lives but concerns the necessities for the maintenance of life (Brown, Held 2010). Medieval cosmopolis could thus encompass all human beings but empirically it was limited only to the Christian world (Inglis 2012).

When we take a large jump to the 17th century, when the republican ideal was spread and the principle of sovereignty triumphed, we see how cosmopolitanism re-emerged within the framework of the system of states. In the eighteenth century, however, cosmopolitanism depicts first an attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality, an attitude of individuals. Later, this view was developed into a theory of international relations. Kant’s cosmopolitanism is based on the idea that peace depends on the creation of a union of states, regulated by laws which would apply to the whole earth. It is built on the universality of moral law, and the respect for the relations between states (Kleingeld, Brown 2014). If ancient cosmopolitanism departed from a planetary order to arrive at a set of rules for a particular political community of polis to achieve the desired happiness for all its inhabitants, Kant’s cosmopolitanism departs from a set of rules between particular political communities to arrive at a global world peace as the desired outcome (Rauscher 2012)

Today’s cosmopolitanism is confronted with yet another empirical situation: a fully developed, world political system of sovereign states. It departs from a critic of this system and postulates international rules beyond states, acknowledging the multiplicity of belongings. Habermas argues, for example, that different people belong to different political groups, and the state is only one among them (Habermas 2001). Citizenship is thus not limited to nationality; respectively it is not limited to nation-states. Cosmopolitanism thus cannot be built up form an effort of states but from social forces that are independent from states. There is an ongoing discussion on the role of states in such a desired cosmopolitan system and a number of authors argue that a genuinely cosmopolitan theory should address the needs and interests of human individuals directly – as world citizens- instead of indirectly, as state citizens (Nash 2006).

There is another twist in the contemporary debates on cosmopolitanism: a number of scholars presume that the world is gradually becoming a shared world, more now than ever. Even if it is now widely acknowledged that connectivity is not a new phenomenon, most authors would claim it now has a new quality and involves actors who previously were not in a position to be ‘world citizens’. Owing to the internationalization of the economy, migratory flows and cultural exchange on the scale and intensity unknown
previously, the world seems to be ‘one’. As a response to this condition, today's cosmopolitanism is intended to define the principle of a power capable of deciding on world affairs (Archibugi et al. 1998). Contemporary cosmopolitanism is thus framed by two parallel processes: of border-crossing and hybridization on a world scale, and bordering and consolidation of national, or ethnic, groups. Accordingly, cosmopolitanism is embedded both in a world system of states and its consequences for the life of people, and in the asymmetric processes of people's interconnectedness on a world scale, beyond and independent of the states (Delanty 2006).

**Conviviality – normative visions**

One of the earliest social scientific normative proposals surrounding conviviality, and one of the most influential, is Ivan Illich's (1973) ‘Tools for Conviviality’. For him, social tools, such as social institutions, could be fashioned in a way to help people live compatibly in complex social systems. The ‘convivial society’ of Illich is such a political arrangement which guarantees the protection of survival, justice and self-defined work. Illich’s vision is rooted in his experience as a priest with a strong critique of the principle of maximal rationality. In an industrial society, Illich saw maximal rationality as a source of frustration and emotional instability for people. For him, a convivial order is thus a post-industrial one, the model for a future that all societies could implement in their own, localized way. The society, reconstructed in a convivial manner, would primarily include “the contribution of autonomous individuals and primary groups”. Institutions should foster self-realization of individuals (Illich 1973, p. 10).

The largely unused potential of his work pertains to the holistic approach to human existence in complex systems that include other humans as well as natural and artificial environments (Hollick 1982; Mitcham 1991; Hoinacki, Mitcham 2002; Barthel, Vetter September 2014); here, some objects and technologies serve as intermediaries that change the quality of human relations and possibilities for sociality and collectivity.

Recently, authors concerned with convivial social settings draw more frequently from Paul Gilroy's (2004) critique of multicultural Britain. At various points in his work, Gilroy choosing to speak of ‘conviviality’ instead of ‘cosmopolitanism’ yet he does not reject the cosmopolitan ideal entirely; rather, he criticizes versions of cosmopolitanism which construct human togetherness without abandoning the categories which fix people to particular, hierarchically located groups. For Gilroy, racial or ethnic difference in a
convivial setting is mundane and conviviality fundamental, even if not a dominant, feature of urban life.

Gilroy (2004, p. xv) frequently links conviviality to ‘multiculture’, a term standing for the observation that ethnic differences have become ordinary or even unremarkable. This, and we will come back to it, is not unproblematic since we hold that cultural and other differences remain meaningful and diversity is maintained.

In this respect conviviality does indeed carry a normative connotation by conveying an optimal social setting. Frequently, the concern with optimal settings for conviviality is tied to the condition of ethnic plurality, not only in Gilroy’s writings. Arizpe’s (1998) early postulate for more ‘experiencing life together’ instead of living side-by-side in a plural society, for example, is grounded in the notion of ‘convivencia’ as a mode of peaceful coexistence that mythically referred to Christians, Jews and Muslims in medieval Spain. However, this reception of medieval Andalusia plays down the fact that the three faith communities never lived together on equal terms (Kamen 1998; Mann et al. 1992). Arizpe’s convivial kind of ‘compatible living’ of all humans with nature is a call for inter-generational and inter-ethnic solidarity. In contemporary multi-ethnic and multi-religious settings, the notion of ‘convivencia’ contains a normative and often idealistic aspiration for peaceful togetherness; it can be an alternative to multicultural politics, as a bottom-up strategy for living together.

However, conviviality is also referred to in terms of ‘good, quality life’ without the reference to a set of regulations for community life. Rather, convivial life, as understood by various urban scholars and planers, relies on other rules and norms, and shared imaginaries of ‘normal’ human togetherness. These could be norms of solidarity, mutual respect, acceptance of difference, hospitality; conviviality appears here an outcome of these rules and norms at work. At the same time, exactly this state – convivial situation – is a normative ideal which could be achieved by assuring conditions for it – accessible spaces enabling equal participation of all, places to dwell, to interact, etc. (Peattie 1998; Fincher 2003; Wood et al. 2010; Laurier, Philo 2006; Fincher 2003).

The two strings of research, the first that derives from the notion of ‘convivencia’ and the second which is located in urban studies differ in how they perceive of the relation of the empirical and the normative: for the first, there could be a tension between the convivial aspiration and multi-ethnic practices, between the normative and the empirical. For the
second, normative frameworks – norms of living together – underpin the convivial
gestures – the normative is the empirical.

Another proposal was recently put forward by a group of French intellectuals: The
“Convivialist Manifesto. A declaration of interdependence” (2014) signed by forty
francophone intellectuals circled around French sociologist Alain Caillé, amongst others
Eva Illouz and Chantal Mouffe, and translated into English in cooperation with Claus
Leggewie. The manifesto is a plea for a new art of cohabitation based on the insight of an
urgent EMPIRICAL necessity: climate change, poverty and inequality, post-democratic
tendencies and corruption, the financial crisis, terrorism, war and expulsion. The
manifesto defines convivialism as a normative -ism, a conception of society which is
based on human cooperation and mutual respect for maximum diversity. It accepts
conflict as a necessary feature of life; it pursues a vision that conflict can be productive if
the social actors share the feeling of belonging to one world. The authors define four
general principles of convivialism: common humanity, common sociality, individuation,
and managed conflict. These four principles privilege the individual human being which
should be strengthened by others in society in developing capabilities. The convivialists’
alternative to utilitarian and rationalist visions of society resembles strongly Illich’s
critical analysis of industrial society but it is based on the conception of ‘gift’ formulated
by French sociologist Marcel Mauss (1990 [1924]). This is the second EMPIRICAL
situation that the authors of the manifesto seek to elevate to a generalized future global
condition: voluntary organizations, families, and friendship networks – they all operate
on the basis of mutual aid, spontaneously and empathetically.

The French convivialism manifesto led to a new intellectual debate in Germany. Adloff,
Heins (2015) write in the introduction to the volume, there is a danger that through the
alarming rhetoric of convivialism, which urges us to immediately react to the empirical
conditions of our time, it might soon lose its attractiveness and universalistic value. After
all, so Adloff, Heins, the French perspectives neglects the solidarity and voluntarism
within the neo-liberal regimes, for example in Germany. Hence, the German convivialism
is less radical and follows different lines. Its point of departure is how to strengthen and
expand the already existing engagements for a better society in which every single
individual is capable of contributing to it.
From normative to analytical cosmopolitanism

The claim of the authors of the convivial manifesto and those responding to it in Germany is to strengthen existing tendencies of convivial existence, the tendencies which are easily observable on a micro-scale of human relations but almost invisible on a macro-scale, in particular if we look at the everyday from the perspective of states or multinational corporations that dominate world politics. In this respect the manifesto resembles cosmopolitanism as defined and propagated by, most prominently but not exclusively, Ulrich Beck (2002a; 2004).

The notion of ‘cosmopolitisation of reality’ coined by Beck means interconnectedness – and thus dependency and interdependency of people across the globe (2004), and it can be best understood through the lens of his ‘theory of global risks’. ‘Cosmopolitisation of reality’ is ‘enforced’, meaning it happens as a side effect of our growing sensibility to global risks rather than the conscious affirmation of cosmopolitan values. Cosmopolitanism is thus a feature of globalization, according to Beck; it is ‘unwanted’ in the sense that it could not be foreseen and it cannot be managed, it is mundane, banal and powerful. It transforms the political order and lives of all people. It can be studied in relation to migration, family, state, science, the religions, social inequality, global risks, climate change and social movements. It happens ‘right here and right now’. ‘Social scientific cosmopolitanism’, the analytical cosmopolitanism, according to Beck, helps us to understand the CURRENT world as a complex, interconnected world (Beck 2006).

In this sense Beck ‘moves’ cosmopolitanism from the future to the ‘here and now’; this shift matches the understanding of a risk as (the current) ‘anticipation of the future’ (Beck 2009). Cosmopolitanism is not a vision for the future, it is the reality of the ‘now’ and ‘here’. It does not mean that Beck does not bother about the future: The challenge is – for now and for the future – to acknowledge this cosmopolitan reality. This is primarily the political system of nation-states which now needs to acknowledge that the reality is cosmopolitan, as well as social science, which tends to continue to study the social reality as though it would be still organized exclusively according to a nation-state principle (Beck 2002b, 2004; 2006). In this sense, the empirical and the normative merge when certain existing forms of sociality that can be labelled as cosmopolitan are also our unavoidable cosmopolitan future.
Beck thus rejects the normative and privileged the empirical, and this has consequences for his sociology: if sociology wants to adequately research the contemporary society, it needs to use a cosmopolitan method, Beck claims. The cosmopolitan methodology acknowledges that the nation-state is only one of the historical frames of interpretation of the social. By rejecting the interpretations which focus entirely on the nation-state, sociology is able to see the global processes as de-localized in their origins and outcomes, as incalculable, and as complex. This is the analytical cosmopolitanism which is necessary in the light of empirical cosmopolitanisation (Beck 2004; Beck, Sznaider 2006).

Now, so Beck, we are at the threshold: certain global risks, such as climate change, have dramatic consequences for the global world order – climate change worsens inequalities between the poor and the rich and between center and periphery, makes the illegitimate and request a new kind of human solidarity. At the same time, climate change might be our chance to radically restructure the global society; in this sense, climate change, as a ‘state of emergency’, induces a ‘cosmopolitan moment’ in which humanity becomes united. It is cosmopolitan because “risk society’s cosmopolitan moment means the conditio humana of the irreversible non-excludability of the distant and alien other” (Beck November 12th, 2008, p. 6).

Beck drew our attention to the empirical and suggested it might be more cosmopolitan than we tend to think. Indeed, a vast number of authors have followed in this trend to analyze the reality as becoming - or being -cosmopolitan. By doing so, though, Beck also invited the critique: While climate change is a “cosmopolitan phenomenon” – as it makes all people irrespectively of their political affiliation and status (though some may think they are better equipped to deal with it than others) interdependent, and - if taken seriously - it might enforce a cosmopolitan global society - other global events seem to be anti-cosmopolitan (Beck 2006). Becks critics stress the prevalence of global inequalities and hierarchies, and global spread of terrorism and crime as phenomena based on global interconnectedness and separatist tendencies leading to establishment of new nation states as key problems for the development of a cosmopolitan world order.

These two positions perceive of the relationship between normative and empirical differently: Beck privileges the empirical over the normative by stressing that cosmopolitanisation (empirical state) happens without us wanting or enforcing it (normative claim); his critics stress the contradictory forces at work in the globalized
world, and the prevailing gap between the ideal of cosmopolitanism (normative claim) and the less-so cosmopolitan reality (empirical state).

A strong critique comes from the post-colonial authors who remind us as much of structures of power and asymmetry of positions in the interconnected world, as well as of a certain genealogy of the normative cosmopolitanism (Bhambra 2011; Braidotti et al. 2013). Eurocentric, rooted in European imperialism, ignoring the multiple worldviews and global projects beyond Europe, this kind of cosmopolitanism is an ‘exploded notion’, as Rosi Braidotti (2013b) termed it. Cosmopolitanism – to be truly cosmopolitan – to meet the standards it sets – needs to critically analyze its own roots, be self-reflexive. If cosmopolitanism is reflexive of its own history and geography, thus analytical in a way it does not ignore its own rootedness, then it needs to ‘explode’ – put in questions its own sense and value for the analysis; Eurocentric cosmopolitanism is clearly defined; if we reject Eurocentrism we might need to ask whether there is Chinese or African cosmopolitanism, and what it has in common with European cosmopolitanism, and if nothing, whether we still need this notion. Or do we name different planetary projects differently to avoid confusion with Eurocentric cosmopolitanism?

Another way to use cosmopolitanism analytically, relies on its empirical qualification (ordinary, everyday, etc.), which is awkward and prone to constant critique. Here the attempt is being made to focus on phenomena that would otherwise not be associated with cosmopolitan lives (Breckenridge et al. 2002; Werbner 2006). Again, these approaches privilege the empirical over the normative which becomes the reason to qualify the concept analytically. However, such simple qualification falls short of doing away with the Eurocentric baggage of cosmopolitanism.

Also for Gilroy (2004), cosmopolitanism derives from a world of hierarchy, it retains imperialist traces; it is entangled with the expansion of Europeans into new territories. Cosmopolitanism works with fixed categories (diversity, plurality of categories) that are rooted in the vocabulary of nation states. That is why Gilroy suggests the term ‘conviviality’ instead of cosmopolitanism.

Indeed, we agree, at least partly, with most of this critique. For us, however, three aspects are of key importance. First, cosmopolitanism is rooted in a dichotomic thinking; each era produced its own central dichotomy: local vs global, political vs religious, particular vs universal, national vs cosmopolitan, etc. Second, cosmopolitanism entails the idea that peace can be achieved with a certain set of rules, if all respect these rules. These rules
constitute a certain world order. Third, current cosmopolitanism often departs from the assumption of moral individualism (Flikschuh 2009), meaning it takes individual persons to be ultimate units of moral significance. Even if sources of moral individual stance in cosmopolitan cannot clearly be tracked back to Kant (ibid.), the revival of cosmopolitan ideals in the Enlightenment is concurrent with the widespread of individualist views (Kleingeld, Brown 2014). In the 20th century, the International Criminal Court strengthen the status of individuals as bearers of certain rights under international law; communists versions of cosmopolitanism stressed the dichotomy between capitalist globalization and individual freedom, and a number of theorists now believe that a cosmopolitan theory should address the needs and interests of human individuals directly (ibid.; Jones 1999).

The impact of individualism on cosmopolitan thought has not been scrutinized throughout; however, some authors point to the liberal cosmopolitan’s appreciation of ethical and normative individualism in the writings of Nussbaum or Pogge (Englund 2012). Chinese scholars explicitly link the development of cosmopolitan ideas in China with individualism brought about by globalization in the 20th century, and identified Chinese cosmopolitanism as placing individual liberty in its core (Xu 2014). Western modernity, according to Charles Taylor (Taylor 2004), establishes a moral order of a society of individuals who come together to collaborate in peace to their mutual benefits. We believe this ‘social imaginary’ pervades in the current normative AND analytical cosmopolitanisms. Yet instead of suggesting a ‘radical mutation’ (Braidotti 2013a) of cosmopolitanism which should include its liberation from the idea of liberal individualism, we suggest conviviality as an analytical term.

It has become clear that some of the crucial strands of the cosmopolitan literature maintain an awkward relationship to the questions of equality and culture. Whether it is mediated by political entities or not cosmopolitanism aspires to the achievement of peace on the basis of the equality of all humans as cosmopolitans. This implies a common humanity which is beyond differences due to cultures or other political affiliations. This ideal has been critiqued for being Eurocentric and elitist due to its philosophical foundations, and thus for speaking from a position of power. As a result, the stance of cosmopolitanism research to inequalities and social hierarchies has been questionable (ex. Braidotti 2013a). Furthermore, cosmopolitanism shares with normative conviviality the strong assumption that the desirable outcome should be peace or peaceful togetherness. While cosmopolitanism often has been cast at a planetary scale, more recent
cosmopolitanism and normative conviviality focus mainly on the city level implying that urban togetherness ought to be peaceful. Thus, research questions formulated within this framework address the ordering structures, relations, rituals and built environment that are appropriate to enable this specific kind of togetherness.

**Conviviality as an analytical term**

As an analytical term, conviviality stands for some conceptual moves which mark its innovative potential. It is not only different from cosmopolitanism approaches, but in an analytical use it also diverts from the normative discussion of conviviality discussed above.

Analytical conviviality departs from a different interest/question: how is the minimal sociality possible? By this we mean that even within the framework of conflict, there are plenty of situations in which people live and/or work together peacefully, obviously beyond their identities, attitudes, solidarities, belongings to different communities and despite their differential positions in social structures. Conviviality distances itself from strictly-rule guided thinking on living with difference that a normative conception of conviviality has fallen prey. Peaceful togetherness means finding ad hoc and temporary commonalities and similarities and consensus over issues of interest or concern in this particular moment of time. These are processes that are difficult to mark, to pin down, to describe and to understand and they often indeed remain unnoticed. As they do, we observe a kind of paradox that people declare having contrary interests, identities and solidarities but that these obviously does not entirely drive their actions and behaviours in everyday situations. The explanatory power of the terms identity, structure, community and solidarity are thus limited.

Analytical conviviality takes the living-with-difference seriously in focusing on the in-between and the fleeting in everyday situations. Fragility thus is a key constitutive of analytic conviviality. The potential we see in an analytical conception of conviviality is its particular ability to capture that which 'happens to happen', or the ordinariness of everyday life. Rather than designing a grant plan for the future based in the observation of seemingly dominant, 'loud' contemporary phenomena – such as fundamentalism or autochthony (Geschiere 2009; Ceuppens, Geschiere 2005), ideas of ethnic solidarity, social integration, cohesion, assimilation, cultural essentialism and closure (Wimmer 2013) – empirical conviviality aims at finding a formulation for those social phenomena
which are not extreme, which are in-between, rather quiet, and which are both more or less peaceful and more or less conflictual. Ultimately, this poses the question of whether conviviality can be achieved (socially engineered) at all, or whether it is just going to happen. It seems likely that conviviality lies beyond individual aims and the rationale of singular forces in the field.

While normative concepts will always play into people’s discourses on living with difference, the practice of conviviality can rather be described as negotiable, and as social processes located in the everyday from which temporary orders might emerge, only to be up for (re)negotiations thereafter.

It would be lightheaded to suggest that the everyday is generally arbitrary or contingent. However, we believe that convivial situations which the authors who write normatively on conviviality suggest to engineer, maintain much potential for surprise and uncertainty. While uncertainty is often related to violence, it is also the result of contained differences and hierarchies, which destabilise sociality. Instead of uncertainty just meaning that categories become less clear or that differences unknown, uncertainty addresses the impossibility to know how an encounter with difference and inequality will play out. Such a take stresses that even routines and rule-guided behavior can break down at any point of the social process (Vigh 2011). People are therefore permanently prepared to react to new social constellations. In the absence of break down, conviviality happens. Basic social practices of (re)negotiation and (re)translation reoccur in the realm of analytical conviviality, yet other rules are hard to identify. Therefore, we refrain from suggesting that the added value of analytical conviviality should be the attempt to come up with rules of social behaviour.

Rather, the aim of analytical conviviality is to provide a language to speak of the fleeting and ‘quiet’ social phenomena which in political discourse on diverse societies are too easily overlooked.

While the sociality which gains centre stage under the lens of analytical conviviality happens alongside all of the ideological projects, it emerges out of the ‘thrown-togetherness’ (Massey 2005) of people, despite being or feeling similar or different, wanting or disliking the fact of encounter, tactically pursuing or avoiding contact. If we agree on this, everyday tension, conflict and frustration form part of a conceptual notion of conviviality, as well as situations of consensus, consideration and respect. The resulting
negotiation and translation processes, which form part of any convivial encounter, necessarily appear as fragile and changing.

Despite the fact that all kinds of other social practices happen alongside conviviality, as an analytical term, it directs the focus on the unremarkable, as well as the interdependence of people. In such fleeting and contested situations, the emerging situation is only ever going to be a relative one (concerned with the ‘more or less’). To understand what is ongoing, we will need to pay attention to the processes which perpetually constitute, change and challenge social relations.

This perpetual change and unpredictable outcomes makes conviviality seem to go beyond that which single people can pre-envision or choose by themselves. The intentions of some might be pointing in this direction, others might be strictly against it. Still, we hold, that all of them are bound up in situations of conviviality, at least from time to time. The everyday of anybody involves situations in which they engage with people who are different and who expose of a social status different to their own. Even people who would claim to avoid such encounters, can be found to (re)translate between their sustained differences and (re)negotiate minimal consensuses.

An analytical conceptualisation of conviviality results from the continuous relevance and re-articulation of power asymmetries and meaningful cultural differences. It embraces difference and power asymmetries instead of insisting on a normative goal of people’s equality. We argue that conviviality facilitates the description of relations among people who maintain their differences. Furthermore, they are not neutral differences, rather they are evaluated and values are attached to them.

Analytical conviviality leaves normative claims of togetherness as sameness behind. Here, a tension yet to be resolved, becomes manifest: do people converge on a minimal consensus on how to live with difference to which they stick? Or is it rather the contingent interplay of differences themselves from which conviviality emerges? More important than pre-empting the result, the strength of analytic conviviality lies with the possibility to scrutinise the processes towards which such questions point.

Let us give you some empirical examples to illustrate the usefulness of conviviality as an analytical term.

The first example is of a very heterogeneous city in Senegal. It is no secret that Muslims, Christians and other believers in this city are constantly placed according to their
religiosity. It defines their social status and relative positionality, as does their ethnicity and a number of other social markers. While such status relies on regionally and locally specific histories, the exact working of the differentiation depends on the situation. Despite such hierarchisation, a range of activities convey that conviviality is taking shape. Activities range from the respectful greeting to the appropriation of public spaces by various fractions of local society on the occasion of festivities, religious and others. Seeming contradictions are plenty, especially if the texture of conviviality with its myriad little details comes into focus.

On the occasion of deciding for one language or another, for example, and choosing from a rich multilingual repertoire of most inhabitants, the sometimes bitter play with status differences becomes particularly visible. All actions are possible: pleasing the powerless in speaking his language, resisting in forcing her to get by in a foreign tongue, choosing a register to mark status difference (French), etc. While multilingual practices are inherently convivial, they also clearly engage with the socially constructed valued differences of the people interacting with one another.

Conviviality encourages an analysis of situations in which people bridge all kinds of socially significant differences. As a result, though, conviviality directs our attention to precarious socialities that are fragile and subject to contestation and change. As a crucial element of this we become aware of social practices that pass otherwise unnoticed since they are fleeting and negotiable, located in the everyday, and that tend to be over before they can be named. It is that which is not extreme, neither peace, nor conflict. It lies in-between, it has aspects of both, peaceful and conflictual elements.

Another example is of an apartment block in a migrant neighbourhood in Spain. In this dense living situation it becomes relatively harder not to take account of the presence of the other inhabitants with whom one thinks one has little or nothing in common. From the perspective of Senegalese, this situation, characterised by minimal to no interaction, stands for the modern individualism of European making. In their reasoning it seems rational to keep to themselves, to reduce greeting to a minimum, in short: to adapt. However, some interactions do take place which range from solving conflicts via the president of the neighbours association, over offering food on public holidays and getting by in encounters on the stairs and at the entrance. For some, such fragmented gestures and actions matter, for others – including many social science analyses – they pass unnoticed, forgotten a split second after the situation is over. While some of such
situations become part of a rational or instrumental analysis in the attempt of making sense of them in interview situations, others remain in the realm of the habitual and the outright social. However, it is such practices and their relative unimportance which reveal the social constitution of people.

Thus, conviviality goes beyond the limits of current analyses which often remain, if not outright, then implicitly bound to relatively simple causal explanations. It seems that those who do the analysis themselves fall back into the reproduction of causalities and teleological reasoning. This might be due to us being ourselves embedded in the modern narrative or imagination of rationally arguing and acting individuals.

**Publication bibliography**


